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Thie sijs

What Constitutes the Valid Delivery of a Deed

by

W. J.

Hamilton.

Cornell University ---

1816.

School of Law

WHAT CONSTITUTES THE VALID DELIVERY OF A DEED.
I

General Divisions o'f the 5Subject.

I
When foiind in the hands of the Grantee.

When found in the hands of a Stranger to be
delivered upon the performance

of a Condition.

ili

Whnen found in the hands
delivered without

of a Stranger to be
Condition.

IV
When found in the hands of the Grantor.

"A deed"

says Littleton, "is

a writing or instru-

ment sealed and delivered to prove the agreement of the
parties to what

is

contained therein."

Without discuss-

ing the merits of this definition from the standpoint of
modern statutory law it
that the grantor in

will be assumred at the outset

the deed has done all that

is necess-

ary for him to do, to make the indtrument a valid deed
with the exception of delivering it.

This delivery is

therefore the last of a series of acts which together
make up the completed
rives its

instrument

force and validity.

; and from which it

Rut delivery

the fact of its being the last of the series,
garded as of less importance

crs; for its presence,
ning the gulf,

is

not from
to be re-

than any of its predecess-

like the last lin

vital,

is

de-

and the law,

in a chain span

far from indulging

any presumption on the ground of what Ias already been
done,

declares

in unqualified terms that a deed without

2
delivery is

void and can convey nothing.

The delivery of a deed,
property by will,
iency

is

; for each is

like the disposition of

treated by the law with r,-reat

len-

bound only by such rules as are ab-

solutely necessary to prevent fraud and imp)osition ; and
in each formality has given place to intent as the criterion by which courts are to be
has made it

-uided.

This movement

necessary for the courts to take under judie

cial interpretation a great variety of acts and circumstances from which the intent of the .yrantor may be derived ; and hence the oft repeated saying in the books
that a deed may be delivered by some act without words,
or by words without any a(.t of delivery,
acts together.

It

or by words and

would be impossible to make anything

more than a general classification of the circumstances
under which a deed may be delivered ; and such a classif&cation Ihzas been attempted as above set forth.
The first dividion of the subject,
deed is

namely,

found in the hands of the grantor,

discuss ed.

when the

will now be

3

A deed found in the hands of the grantee, named there; (97 N. Y. 13,

in, is prima facie evidence cf a delivery
27 Penn. St.

30. )

and, while clear and convincing evi-

dence to the contrary is required to rebut this presumption

(88 Ill.

,

378. )4

the fact that

it

is only a pre-

sumption indicates that there may have been a mere tradition of the deed to the grantee, for purposes other than
delivery

; and such, indeed, may be the

case

; then the

tradition may have been made to await the determination
of the grantee as to whether or not he will accept the
deed.

(4,Yeyes

315. )

This situation is
v.

illustrated in the case of

James when a deed was placed in

grantee

to await his acceptance

opinion the

court said,-

the hands

; and in

the

Ford

of the
course of the

"he did not deliver it

to

James

as and for the deed of the grantor, but merely left it
with him as a depository,

until

whether or not he would take the

he

should determine

land

: this

w

constitutes

no legal delivery."
"A deed may be deposited with the grantee or handed

4
to him for any purpose other than as the deed of the
grantor or as an effective instrument between the parties,
without
279.

(24 Wend.

becoming at all operative as a deed."

1 Conn. 494. )
A deed may also be placed in the hands of the grantee

for the purpose of examination ; to be returned if found
defective

; or it may be there in the process of trans-

mission to a third party to hold as an escrow;

or again

it may be held by the -rantee to await the action of some
third party.
43.

23 Wend

(20 N. Y. 77, 13 N. J. Eq. 454.

8 Mass. 230.

108 111. 336.

13 0. St. 253.

28 N. Y.

333. )
This situation does not at all conflict with the
well known principle that a deed can not be delivered to
the grantee, therein named, as an escrow, for,

if done,

it

will take effect instanter and the condition will be void.
(4 Watts, 180.

23 J. & S. 98.

21 Mass.

518.)

In the one case there has been no delivery and no
intent to deliver ; but a mere tradition, which like the
offer in any contract, is subject to revocation before
acceptance, or before what amounts to acceptance
grantee has not received the deed as grantee;

; the

but as a

mere agent of the grantor, and subject to his direction.

U

of delivery as an escrow,

the case

in

has bound himself,

the grantor

from the moment of placing the deed

within the hands of the depositary,. to observe the condition upon which it

was so depo-sited

; and to permit the

deed to take effect upon the performance of the same.
(5-80

31 Amer. Dec. 563.

644.

Wis.

629.

il

believed to be the distinction as

This is

Wash. 318. )

b N. Y.

supported by the weight of authority

; though the courts

are not in

entire harmony upon this point.

4 Day 66.

57 Mich. 264. )

C Contra

A deed absolute upon its

face and in the hands of the grantee my also be shown
and the following quotation from the

to be a mortgage,
Supreme
point

Court. of Pennsylvania may be of value on this
"It

:--

is

true the written defeasance bears
if

date a few days after the date of the conveyance.
they bear even date they constitute
is

but when the defeasance

of a later

in law a mortgage;
date it

is

a ques-

tion of fact for the jury to determine under the parol
evidence whetherthe

Penn.

St.

conveyance was a mortgage."

71. )

"While a subsequent
y,

(1

on repayment

an absolute

independlent agreement to recow.-

of the purchase money,

conveyance

int

a mortgage,

will no~t change
yet the fact that

6
the defeasance

bears a later date does not preclude a par-

ty from showing by parol that
ance of an agreement
delivered

in pursu-

was executed

it

under which the deed was made and

; thus forming a part of the same.transaction."

Although it

is

in the hands of the

competent

to show that a deed found

grantee was obtained surreptitious-

ly, a court of law can give no aid to a grantor who has
once made a valid delivery of his deed,
done under false representations
some mistake of fact or law.
627.

be

of the grantee or through

( 21 N. Y. 279.

58 N.

Y.

Tkdeman's Real Property, Sec. 812.
Under these circumstances,

title,

though it

in order to

divest the

it will be necessary to appeal to equity ; but, if

in the meantime the rights(0f ,an innocint purchaser have
intervened, the latter's titl.e will be indefeasible.
Whether, therefore, in any given case a valid delivery has been made is a question of intent ; and this by
the great weight of authority is held to be

the crucial

test ; but since the intent can be but an inference drawn
from th~e facts in each case, these res gestae may be such
as to permit of but one

conclusion ; and under such cir-

cumstances the co~urt would be warranted in taking the case
from the jury and directing a verdict.

( 121 Ill.

91.

7
118 Mass. 154.
253.

79 N. Y. 525.

30 Me. 110.

13 0. St.

28 N. Y. 333.
As to w1hat acts of the parties will lead to an inev-

itable conclusion of an intent to deliver, the court
Souuerbyb

v. Arden said

:

in

"But if there be no such agree

ment or intention made known at the time and both parties
are presentl and the usual formalities of execution take
place and the contract is to all appearance consummated
and the deed is
the

left

in the power of the grentee or in

custody of his particular friend, without special in-

struction, there is no case to be found in law or equity
in which such a deed is

not head binding."

(1 John ch.

255.)
At the present day,

however,

even in

the face of such

formality, it has been held that parol evidence may be introduced to show a prior agreement, on the part of the
parties ; not that the deed shall not take effect, but
that until something be done it shall not be considered
as having been delivered

; and in this connection it may

be well to quote the very pertinent and suCWinct language
of an early New York case as follows

:

"Whe t~her a deed

has been delivered or not is a question of fact upon
which from the very nature oif the case parol evidence is

8
(108 I1.

adxnissible."

Ill Wash. 293.

360.

11 Bar-

ber 351. )
"But whether a deed when delivered shall take effect
absolutely or only upon the performance of some condition,
not

expressed therein, cannot be determined by parol ev-

idenc e."
an offer in a pa

The delivery of a deed differs frcrn

rol contract in that the one is irrevocable before acceptance and the other may be revoked ; but they are similar
in the

fact that both require acceptance

:

in the one

case before title can pass to the grantee% and in the
other before the contract can be binding upon the offeree
(Anson on Contracts 31. )

or the offeror.

A deed in the hands of the grantee, however, is priroa facie evidence of acceptance

; but this presuxnption

may be rebutted by parol evidence to the contrary, and
until there has been an acceptance, express or implied,
the title remains in the
of his creditors.

grantor, subject to the claim

After there has once been a valid der-L

livery of a deed, the title cannot be made to revert by a
redelivery of the deed; for a title can be transferred
only by deed.
99.

95

I11.

(42. N. J. L. 279.
27. .

47.

Barb.

505.

39 N. H.505. 3
45 N.

H.

505.

N. H.
4 Wend.

9
474.

1 Ohio 321.

2 Wend. 617. )

11
When found in the hands of a Stranger to be
delivered upon the performance

Chancellor Kent,

of a Condition.

in the Comentaries

delivery of a deed in

escrow is

says that the

"a conditional delivery

to a stranger to be kept by him until certain conditions
be performed and then to be delivered over to the grantee."
Whether a deed when placed in the hands of a third
party is

to take effect as an escrow or is

at ounce,

must

in

to pass title

all ceses depend upon the intent with

which the deed was deposited ; but when this intent
is

a matter of inference,

holds that
is
is,

if

an escrow

then the weight

the delivery depends upon a condition
; and if

it

upon the happening of an event.it

in the phrase of the courts,

presently."

of authority

the

"grantor's

Passing over, for the present,

deed

the criti-

cism made by later cases upon this attempt to distinguish
between a condition and an event
upon such distinctions,

; and to base

decisions

an effort will be made to show

that even by the earlier cases these distinctions,

if

l1

nominal" and that,

there4 were any at all, were,erely
fact,, deeds delivered to

third persons

in

to be deliverted

to the grantees named on the performance of a condition
or

the occurrence of an event, were treated in every res-

301.

5 Met.

15 Wend.

660.

30 Wis. 651. 111 Wash

(34 N. Y. 360.

pect as escrows.

72 Pa. 441.

414. 8 Met. 439. 54 Pa. 26.
5 Conn. 320 111 Wash. 300. )

In the case of Foster v. Mansfield which is often
cited as an authority for the above doctrine, Shaw C. J.
said

"Wh1j.en

the future delivery is to depend upon the

payment of money or th9 performance

(3 Met. 414. 54 Penn

tion it will be deemed an escrow."
26. 72 Penn. 441. )

of some other condi-

"When it is merely to wait the

lapse of time or happening of some contingency and not
the performance of any condition it will be deemed the
grant or's deed presently; still it willnot take effect

as a deed until the second4delivery;
livered_ it

will

take

by

effect

relation

but when thus defrom the first

del ivery,."
"But this

distinction

is

n,'t now very material

be-

cause when the deed is delivered as an escrow and afterwards and before the second delivery the grantor becomes incapable of making a deed,

the deed should be

ll
considered as taking effectifrom the first
order to accomplish the

in

delivery;

intent of the grantor which

would otherwise be defeated by the

intervening in

capaci-

This opinion as far as its authority goes shows beyond question that the phrase,
ly" in
title

such general use,

"grantor's deed present-

does not mean that an absolute

passes to the grantee, when the deed is

to the depositary;
sentencle:

"Still

it

for if

this were

so the succeeding

will not take effect as a deed until

the second delivery but when thus
take effect

by

relation

delivered

from the first

would be absolutely devoid of sense.
cessity

if

Again,

it

will

delivery",
What possible ne-

could there be for the legal fiction

the title

delivered

of relation

has already passed ?
in

the case

of Stewart

v.

Stewart

in

which

the grantor deposited with a third party a deed conveying
property

the

to h^+;

court held,-

children,

"it

to be delivered upon his

never was the intention of Stewart

to devise his estate but to convey it

"The
and is

death,

instrument of conveyence

therefore deficient

in

ha'

by deed."

( 6 Conn

two witnesses

legal formalities

only

indis-

12
pensable to a devise : besides it is strictly spealing a
I do not mean
deed taking effect from its execution.

that it was consummate nor is it necessary it should be,
but that it was efficacioes to the passing of th'.e interest conveyed from the delivery of the deed to the trustee
or agent-."

Again,

in the case of Tooley v. Dibble,

in which

the

facts were essentially those of the preceding casel,
with the addition that a quit-claim deed was given-by the
son between the first and second delivery of the deed in
question :-

it was held that the

deed of the son passed

title as against the heirs of the father ; but would not
have done so against the intervening rits of third
persons; and this would have been the exact situation had
the deed been

pressly deposited as an escrow; to pass

title upon the death of the grantor; and, indeed, the
opinion of thle court contains the words

:

"If not tech-

nically an escrow it was in the nature of one and on the
death of defendant's father it took effect by relation,

( 2 Hill, (i41.)

etc."

There can certainly be no better illustration of an
event, pure and simple, than the death of the grantor;
but in

the absence of an express

intent

to the contrary

the courts have almost uniformly treated this as an escrow ; that is,

(72 Penn. 434.

tion.
37 Mich.

264.

I think,

Shaw,

have applied to it

the doctrine of rela34 O. St.

77 311. 47--

34 N. Y. 9 .

5 Conn.

316.

we may agNlt

therefore,

in holding that there is

610.

with Chief Justice

no material distinction

between a deed to be delivered upon a condition or event;
both are subject before the condition or event to the
intervening rights of third parties ; neither are subject
tb the intervening claim of the grantor or his
the one may take effect by relation if

necessary to avoid

the intervening incapacity of the grantor,
death or otherwise;
relation,

privies;

by reason of

the other will always take effect,

by

but the result as regards the granteel title

will be precisely the same.

(13 N. J.

Eq.

459.

4 Kent,

454. 30 Wis. 644. )
There seerns to be,

at least,

two criticisms made by

same authorities upon the practice of courts in holding
that a deed to be delivered by the depositary upon the
death of the grantor should be treated as an escrow.
It is
title,

obviously necessary that in order to pass

b_ the deed,

fiction of relation;

the courts must resort to the leg'al
but,

the critics argue, this doc-

14
trine of relation is only a fiction, which as between the
parties

is intended to avoid something which ray, not

something which will necessarily happen to make the second delivery impossible.
26G. ) 'X

(Taft v. Taft XXX1]J A.L.J.

It would seem that in Wheelwright v. Wheel-

wright the court in showing w

the doctrine of relation

should apply to a deed to be thus delivered,
the examples given,

prove by

not that relation may take place when

the death of the grantor is

the event upon which the sec-

ond delivery is

but that

to be made;

if

his death inter-

vene between the first delivery and the event upon which
the second delivery is to be made,that thus there may be
a relation. (2 Mass. 254. )
The second criticism is

to the effect

that such doc-

trine encroaches upon the domain of the testamentary
disposition of property;
Denio C. J. said

:-

and in

Hathaway v.

Payne,

"If it were an original question, 1

should suppose that such a transaction was of a testa-

mentary character and that it would be inoperative for
want of the attestation required by th~e Statute of Wills.
(34 N. Y. 113.

30 Wis.

644.

2,Ves. Jr. 231. )

"But

the cases establish the rule as 1 have stated and they
should not now be disturbed."

15
Baker,

In the case of Pintzman v.

to take place
passes

title

is
at

once";

and profits

only by

qualified

grantor to use and occupy

that

the

the right of

the

certain to]o happen,

one which is

or take and receive the

during his life

or until

the event

have happened upon which the second delivery
made."
In
Hathaway

(4oWis.
support
v.

to be

644.)
of this

doctrine

Payne and Tooley v.

as shown above

to convey title

rents

shall

is

the court
Dibble

refers

; but

in

case the deed was held to be good by relation
second case

is

the delivery

event upon which

vanced that when the

ad-

is

the theory

the one

and in

the

the quit-claim deed was held

only as against

or and his heirs.

to

the

(34 N. Y. 115.

claim of the

2 Hill 641.

grant-

)

This position is further criticised by Campbell C. J.?
in

Taft v.

Taft when he says

in present terms,

is

"A deed of conveyance

-

inconsistent with the retention of

a life estate and from the time when the deed is

deliver-

ed as a conveyance the whole title

goes with it and it

be comes irrevocable. "

34 N. Y. 92.)

(5; Mich.

There are many propositions regarding an escrow in
which the courts are in substantial harmony and thtese
will not be briefly noticed.

In

accord with the prin-

16
ciple that the delivery
it

is

the condition

437. )

as an escrow
of it

unwritten and part of a con-

irrevocable nor can the

is

as the condition

which delivery

30 Wis.

(Cases cited above.
42 O.

is

to be made

is

St. 47.

66 Me.

grantor gain

permits

upon thaSprinciple

laid

writing.

in

a deed when delivered

indicated above,

As

except
is

al stress

92.

condition on which

by the Statute of Frauds to be

tract.required
(42 Wis.

proved by parol,

though it would be other-

to be delivered,

an escrow is

trol

to prove by parol the

competent

wise were

of a deed may be

; and especi-

when the

the grantor's

651.

con-

event upon
death.
4 N.Y.

34 N. N. 360.

316..)

A deed in order to be deposited as an escrow must
not be in

the possession actual

the grantor or grantee;

and thus

depositary being a stranger
as the agent

much bound

in

the

(4

4535.

to with hold it

7 Ohio,
however,

of the

sense that he is

to deliver the deed on performance

as he is

]t is,

the necessity

of either

; though he may be regarded

of both parties

dition,
Yris.

or constructive

as

of the con-

until perfoxnance.

2 3.)
rather the performance of the con-

dition than the second delivery wh ich passes the title,
for though as a rule,

the title

is

said not to pass un-

17
til

the second delivery,

still,

if

grantor becomes incapacitated
the condition is

performed,

to deliver a deed before

the deed will be considered

valid as of the time of the first
condition is
Wis.

644.

however,

for any reason the

delivery,

afterwards performed.

1 John.

279. )

ch.

when the

( 14 Ohio, 308.

30

It should be observed,

that where the deed is

not to be delivered until

something has been done after tlhe death of the grantor,
it

is

void and can pass no title

the grantor.
If

(Taft

59 Mich. )

an escrow be-delivered before the performance of

the condition
even if

v. Taft

as against the heirs of

it

afterward

cannot
it

an innocent purchaser

affect the title

be recorded and then transferred to
; for no deed can be delivered wit1k

out the consent of the grantor

; though upon t;he second

point the authorities are not in
(22 Me.

569.

10 Penn.

in the grantor;

285.

entire harmony.

4th Edition I11

Wash.

303.

I]]

When found in

the hands

delivered without

That a deed,
title,

its

intent

so to do

ry,

still,

of a stranger to be
condition.

thus delivered,

may pass a present

delivery to the depositary must be with the
; and though no formal words are necessa-

the mere fact of handing the deed to the de-

positary will raise no presumption of an intention to
deliver,

as it

will when delivered

ee or'to his agent.
In

this case it

in person to the grant-

(15 Wend. 6b6.

3 Ohio St.

becomes as necessary

part with all right

and title

delivered to the grantee

377. )

for the grantor to

to the deed as if

it

were

; for the depositary now be-

comes a mere bailee of the deed for the grantee and subject to his direction.

(30 Wis. 644.

34 N. H. 476.

14 Ohio, 310.)
With regard to the acceptance
of a third party,

whether it

is

of a deed in the hands

to be delivered to the

grantee with or without any condition,

the general prin-

ciple may again be stated that no offer under seal can
be revoked by the grantor or his privies at any time be-

19
; though in the case

fore acceptance

of an escroW the
permit such re-

per se,

failure of the condition may,
vocation.

The ri uht&of third parties,
by a different

rule

45 N.

.IT
505.

are governed

; for until there has been an accept-

ance the property is
505.

however,

subject to such riF.tX

)

(47

Barb.

An acceptance may be actual,

when the gifantee actually assents,

or it

as

may be presumed

either from the acts of the grantee with knowledge
the deed or from the nature of the deed itself

of

as being

beneficial to grantee, or from tlhe situation or condition
of the grantee as in

the case of infancy or insanity.

The rule as above laid down cannot be changed by
the fact that the acceptance

did not take place until

after the death of the grantor.
St.

26. )

deed is
latter

(9 Mass. 307.

54 Penn.

When there has been no express assent and the

beneficial to the grantee,
knew of it

or not,

sumption of assent,

whether the

the law will then raise a pre-

which however,

ficient to pass the title

and,

; but

is

is

not,

per se,

suf-

merely prima facie

evidence of assent and may be rebutted by showing a dissent.
31 Conn.

( 4th Edition ILl Wash .
428.

28 iowa 240. )

291.

3 Ohio. St.

Where property

is

377.
thus

20
deeded to a grantor,

this presump-

under disabilities,

tion then becomes a rule of law and the property vests
at once,
(30

St.

so as to bar the claims of third parties.
587.

47 N. H. 479.

39 111. 413.
6

28 iowa 241).

The relation of the depositary to the grantee may be
such as to make the assent of t he former sufficient to
vest the title

in the grantee

; as for example,

an ac-

ceptance of a deed by a father or mother for his or her
infant child.
There is

)47 N. H.

479.

also a class of cases in which from the be-

neficial nature of the grant,
presumption

i John. ch. 456. )

of acceptance

the law raises a conclusive

; namely,

those conveyances

which insolvent debtors make for the benefit of creditors

; by delivering

deed of assi.7nient
the creditor.

absolutely and unconditionally

to a third person to be delivered to

Such a deed, though not accepted, will

take precedence of an attachment
delivery

a

intervening between the

to the depositary and the actual acceptance.

(lb Peters 19.

18 Conn.

257. )

21

IV

When found in the hands of the Grantor.

It is trite law that when there has once been a
valid delivery of a deed, no act of the grantor can destroy the title in the grantee ; but,

since delivery is

always a matter of intent, the facts and circumstances
of each case must be weighed, to determine not only that
the

intent once existed but that it existed at the time

the acts relied upon were done.
On this subject Chancellor Kent says :

"if both

parties be present and the usual formalities of execution
take place and the contract is to all appearances consunnTated without any condition or qualification
ed,

it

is

be left
is

annex-

a complete and valid deed, notwithstanding it

in the custody

of the grantor;"

and,

indeed,

it

well established that the grantor after delivery may

keep the deed as the mere bailee of the grantee.
(IV Kent Com. 455.

41 N. Y. 416. 116 Penn St.

6. )

Cases often arise wh~ere no formal delivery can be
proved and even where nothing was said by the parties
present

in regard to delivery

; but, notwithstanding, an

intent

that the property should pass may be gathered from
; as,

other circumstances
Lands

prepared for execution,

is

sealed and acknowledged,

it

signed by both parties,

has been held delivered

though%the witnesses present
formal delivery,

declared there had been no

and the deed was found among the papers

of ti-te grantor after the latter's
126 Mass. 454. )
a title

No deed,

and which was found in

416.

death.

however,

in the grantee during the life

his death,

where a deed of

for instance,

(15 W/end.

which did not vest
of the grantor,

tIe passession of the grantor at

can be of any avail as a conveyance.

32 A.L.J.

251. )

(41 N.Y.

At the time when delivery is

neither the grantee nor his agent need be present
although.,

as a rule,

temporaneous acts,

545.

made

; for,

delivery and acceptance must be constill,

in the case of voluntary

con-

veyances the acceptance when made will relate back to
the time of delivery and take effect
the exclusion of all

ties

; and in

claims

except those of third

par-

case the grantee be under any disability,

then the presumption of acceptance
law and will bar the claims
Therefore,

as of that time- to

will be made a rule of

even of third parties.

where there has once been a valid delivery

of the deed, an acceptance of the same even after the

23
death of the grantor will operate to cut off the rights
The great strugglez

of those claiming under the grantor.
in

the courts,

however,

acts of the grantor

in

arise over the interpretation
delivering

over those of the grantee in
been said the deed derives
its

delivery

and not so much

accepting

; for as has often

its force and validity from

rather than frohn

There is

;

of

its acceptance.

a decided tendency in the courts to favor

the operation of a deed of voluntary

settlement,

and to

give greater force to the acts of both grantor in

deliv-

ering and of the grantee in

in

the case of 9ouverbye v.
"A voluntary settlement

accepting the same

Arden,

Chancellor Rent says

fairly made is

equity upon the grantor,

always binding in

unless there be clear and de-

cisive proof that he never parted or intended to part
with the possession of the deed ; and,
it,

the weight

validity

of authority

is

intended to be absolute."

ions

decidedly

536. )
is

This,

however,

to show that

Cl Jo'm..
in

Ch.

he retain

in favor of its

unless there be other circumstances

mere fact of his retaining it,

ch.

even if

240.

besides the

it

was not
12 Jo1u.

the light of later decis-

an extreme view and the courts of New York now

refuse to be guided by the doctrine

; "because" as was

24
said in a late case of' that state "it wholly dispensed
with

any evidence of delivery" and, indeed, the view of

the New York courts seems to be supported by the weight
of authority.

(41 N. Y. 416.

7 N. Y. 22.)

in gritchfield v. Critchfield

fror, its being ne-

cessary to prove that a deed, beneficial on its face to
the grantee and found in the possession of the grantor,
was not intended by the grantor to pass title the courts
say :

"Thie presmption arising from the acknowledgement

before the magistrate that the deed had been duly signed
/

sealed, and delivered was rebutted by the fact that the
grantor took the deed away from the office and kept it
in his own possession."
In Patterson v. Snell, the court say : "The possession and production of a deed by the grantee is prima
facie evidence of its having been delivered and for like
reasons, in the absence of all contradictory testimony
the presumption arises, when found in t1n possession
and produced by the grantor, that it has not been delivered."

(67 Maine. )

in the case of Cannon v. Cannon A, with his wife
executed voluntary deeds to B and C withtout their knowledge.

(26 N.

J.

Eq. )

He gave the deeds to his wife

telling her to be

structions

careful

of them

or authority to deliver them ; and,

absence from home,

during his

and without his knowled:e or consent,

induced B and C tC:

his wife

but without

25
other in-

convey the property to her,

and it was held that the deed to B and C never passed
title.
Again, in the case of Powers v. Russell these words

:

occur in the opinion

"When a registered deed puroortig

to have been delivered has been lost, the presumption is
that it was delivered to the grantee

; but this presump-

tion, which would arise from the loss

is rebutted if

the original deed is produced and is then in tihe

custody

of the grantor."
The

illinois courts, however, hold a doctrine more

in accord with gouverbye v. Arden above.
251. )

These cases, therefore,

the mere possession
one

(32 A.L.J.

seem to indicate that

of the deed thc;uh it be a voluntary

by the grantor will not support any presumption of

acceptance;

because in

such a case there can be no pre-

sumption of delivery but rather the contrary.

There arg

however', certain acts of the grantor which, standing
alone, the

delivery;

courts

will

and prominent

regard as prima facie evider~e of

ariong thJese

is

the recording of

26
a dee-;
tends

for by such an act the

to

to give notice to the world that the title

grantee ;

in

and

the contrary the

courts will

117 N.

See

regard the grantor as havin)
43.

(23 Wend.

111.

107

and with the

never was

is
in

repelled when it

appears

possession and that

the

heirs have remained

in

(67 Me.

that the deed is

that the grantee

grantor and his

recog;nizing any rights under

559.

71 N. Y.

474. )

The

fact

or is

a pure and unqualified gift

strengthen the presumption of a delivery
deed.

of t.e

ty of an assent

by the grantee where

character,

] desire

length from the very forcible

in

the case of Mitchell v.

in

the course

arising

With reg,ard to the necessi-

from the record

of thze above

a

will

conveyance to grantees under any disabilities
gr.eatly

from

arising

undisturbed possession for more

than forty years without
the deed.

3 Ohio

consent of the

and the presumption of a delivery

the record

87.

But the recording must

258. )

Ye,

be done during the life
grantor

to

the absence of controlling evidence

delivered the deed.
377.

his

in

been taken from hirn and put

certain property has

St.

grantor necessarily in-

to

the conveyance
quote s crewhat

is
at

opinion of Judge' Thurmnn

Ryan.

of his opinion the

(6 Ohio St.
Judg e

said

37r%.

:

"I

)
is

27
than 1

true that judges have said with more solen-iity

think the occasions warranted, that no one can have an
estate thmst upon him against his will;
quently a delivery
of the grantee

is

and that conse-

of a deed to a stranger for the use

of no effect until assented to by the

latter."

"How much weight

this argument is

entitled to may

be judged by the fact that estates are every day thrust
upon people by last will and testament and it

would cer-

tainly sound somewhat novel to say that the devises were
of no effect until assented to by the devisees."
"If

a father should die

devising an estate to his

daughter and the latter should afterwards die without a
knowledge of' thwe will it

would hardly be contended that

the devise became void for want of acceptance;

and that

the heirs of the devisee must lose the estate."

"Add to these the estates that are thrust upon
people by the statiute of descent and we begin to estimate the value of the arguament that a man shall not be
made a property holder against his

will; and that courts

should be astute to shield him from such a wrong."

28
"When

the

-;rant is

the true rule is

a pure unqualified

-:-ift I think

th,_at the presumption or acceptance

be rebutted only by proof of dissent;

and it

matters not

that the grantee never knew ol the conveyance
assent

is

presumed from its beneficial

can

for as his

character,

the

prestumption can be overthrown only by proCf that he did
know and rejected
"f

th.is

is

it."
not so how can a deed be made to an

infant of such tender years as to be incapable
"Is it

the law that

if

a father makes a deed of gift

to an infant child and delivers

it

to the recorder for

the use of the child and to vest the estate in
deed

is

it,

the

of no effect until the child grow to years of

intelligence

and give its consent

in t-.e meantime
debts

of assent'?

"May

?"

be taken for the subsequently contracted

of the father or will the statute

gin to run in
that the title

favor of the

bene2icial

is

in

such a case

idea

thte acceptance

of

from the

grant and not a rmere presumption

of an actual acceptance. "
"And for the

same

be-

"1 do not so

a presumption of law arising

nature of the

or limitations

trespasser upon the

remains in the adult?"

tuderstand the law.
thre grantee

the estate

reason that

the law makes the

29
presumption it

does not allow

anything short

of actual

Lastly it

may be said that the mere signing and ac-

by other acts,

26 N.

J

will not,

unless accompa -

be sufficient to constitute

(24 Penn. St. 100.

very.

to be disproved by

dissent.

knowled,-ing of an instrument,
nied

it

5 Hump.

349.

a deli-

Cannon v. Cannon

Eq.J

It would be impossible even to outline the variety
of circumstances in which evidence may be given to support and rebut presumptions of the grantor's intent, and
it

is

but mere repitition to say that whern a deed is

tained by the grantor the real test
get possession of it
grantor's will ?

?

is,

can the grantee
against the

Can he enforce it

Did the grantor intend

re-

that at all

events and in-ediately it should operate ?

